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Unwanted Allies:
Koreans as Enemy Aliens in World War II
Michael E. Macmillan
Koreans arriving in Hawai'i in the early 1900s brought with them a
deeply ingrained dislike of the Japanese. The historical roots of their
animosity extended at least to the end of the 16th Century, when
Japanese invaders devastated much of the Korean peninsula. Within
the lifetimes of some of the early immigrants, the Japanese had used
gunboat diplomacy to force upon Korea its first Western-style treaty;
had fought China on Korean soil in order to wrest Korea from its
place in the traditional Sinocentric international order; had tried
to impose major reforms on the Korean government; and had
engineered the murder of a Korean queen. In 1905, Japan established
a protectorate over a Korean government that was too weak to resist
and in 1910 finally snuffed out the existence of Korea as an indepen-
dent nation.
Few Koreans accepted the legitimacy of Japanese rule over the
peninsula, and the oppressiveness of the colonial regime only fortified
in most the desire to restore independence. This Koreans attempted
to achieve through an active, but largely ineffectual, independence
movement in China, Siberia, and the United States. In Hawai'i,
hostility was deepened by resentment over the evident rise of
Japanese influence in the islands and, Koreans claimed, their
infliction of the same kind of abuse and discrimination that Koreans
suffered under the Japanese at home.
Thus, it is unlikely that any group welcomed the outbreak of the
Pacific war on December 7, 1941, as did the Koreans. In Korean
eyes, the war brought promise of retribution upon Japan for her
long and deliberate aggression and hope that the government of
Korea would soon revert to Korean hands.
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In these circumstances, many Koreans in Hawai'i were stunned
to find that they were, because of the Japanese seizure of their
homeland, regarded as enemy aliens and restricted in some of the
same ways that alien Japanese were. Even Americans of Korean
ancestry, while free of the legal limitations placed on their noncitizen
parents, felt a measure of discrimination because of the status of
their elders.
KOREANS IN HAWAl'l ON THE EVE OF THE WAR
Koreans had arrived in Hawai'i in numbers between 1903 and
1905, when some 7,000 men, women, and children answered the call
of labor recruiters for the sugar plantations. The Japanese blocked
this migration in 1905. Thereafter the number of Koreans arriving
in Hawai'i dwindled, varying from as few as two in 1909 to as many
as 116 in 1917, many of these being "picture brides."1 Some who
came did not remain, of course, and by the eve of World War II,
the Korean community numbered only 6,851, or 1.6 percent of the
territory's population. Eighty percent of them lived on Oahu.2
Although brought to the islands to be plantation workers, relatively
few of the immigrants were experienced in agriculture. About 14
percent are said to have been farmers; the rest had been laborers,
soldiers, government clerks, policemen, miners, woodcutters, domestic
servants, or students, or considered themselves political refugees. The
majority were young men between the ages of 20 and 30.3 As might
be expected, they moved steadily away from the plantations and into
other pursuits, so that by the 1930s only some 500 Koreans remained
in the employ of the sugar growers. Others had established them-
selves in the professions and in small businesses, most notably as
tailors, retail dealers, shoemakers, carpenters, machinists, and
dockworkers.4
Time, law, and the pattern of immigration produced distinct
cleavages in attitudes and interests among the Koreans in Hawai'i.
Under U.S. naturalization laws, Asian immigrants were ineligible
for citizenship, but their children born in Hawai'i became American
citizens at birth.5 In 1940, 2,390 of the Koreans living in the Islands
were aliens ineligible for citizenship, while the remaining 4,461 were
native-born citizens. Age differences also affected attitudes and
aspirations: nearly 60 percent of the Korean Americans in Hawai'i
were 18 or younger, while 80 percent of their noncitizen elders were
more than 45 years of age.6 The Koreans themselves recognized that
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there were generational differences in attitudes and that the main
interests of those holding American citizenship lay with the United
States and not with Korea.7
These differences were reflected in the leadership of the civic and
patriotic organizations formed among the Koreans, a leadership
dominated by the older, noncitizen generation. It was they who spoke
out on matters related to Korea, and it was they who did most to
nurture hostility toward the Japanese.8 Interviews with older Koreans
and observers of Korean affairs during the first year of the war
uniformly revealed a "consistently antagonistic and suspicious
attitude toward . . . alien and citizen Japanese alike. . . ."9 Even the
intense personal rivalries that were the hallmark of Korean politics
did nothing to disrupt unanimity on this issue.
Young Korean Americans, on the other hand, were not so uniform
in their views. Most showed no special affection for the Japanese,
but neither were their attitudes marked by the bitterness that
characterized those of their parents. Yet when the occasion called for
it they made their opposition to Japan clear, as in their response to
suggestions that they might, as a result of Japanese rule in Korea,
possess dual nationality or owe some allegiance to Japan.10
The primary outlet for anti-Japanese sentiment was participation
in organizations such as the Kungmin-hoe (Korean National
Association), Tongji-hoe (Comrades Society), Sino-Korean People's
League, Korean Independence Party, and Korean Women's Relief
Society. Although these organizations were often bitterly divided
over leadership, personalities, and tactics, they were united in their
central concern, the restoration of Korean independence, and this
preoccupation, more than anything else, held together the small
Korean community.11
These organizations carried on such essentially negative activities
as anti-Japanese agitation, as well as more positive pursuits such as
securing permission for Koreans to register as Koreans, rather than
as Japanese subjects, under the Alien Registration Act of 1940.12
Their influence was most evident in their ability to raise money to
finance Washington lobbyists and to support the so-called Korean
Provisional Government in China.13
As the threat of war in the Far East grew at the end of the 1930s,
the pace of such activities quickened, and interest in the Korean
independence movement intensified. One sign of this was the
formation in Honolulu in April 1941 of the United Korean Com-
mittee in America as a means to focus the activities of the various
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Hawai'i and mainland groups on the common goal of restoring a free
Korea. When war finally came in December 1941, it was widely
viewed by Koreans as the beginning of the road to liberation—a
natural, and expected, culmination of Japan's aggression and a
validation of the Korean assessment of the Japanese people.14
WAR AND MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAII
With their reputation as outspoken critics of Japan and amid their
optimism about an early liberation of Korea, probably none of the
Koreans in Hawai'i foresaw the extent to which they would be
caught in the web of security measures that enmeshed the islands
immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Acting on plans built
on a fear of espionage and sabotage by members of Hawai'i's large
population of Japanese ancestry, Lieutenant General Walter G.
Short, commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department, established
martial law on the afternoon of December 7, 1941, and assumed full
authority over civilian affairs. Short and his successors, adopting the
title "military governor," remained in control with only grudging
surrender of authority to civil officials until October 1944, when
martial law was revoked.15
The war meant restrictions and deprivations for all of Hawai'i's
people. General orders issued by the military governor controlled
everything from traffic regulations and interisland travel to garbage
collection and dogs. For Japanese, they were especially fearful times.
Within three days, the Army had detained 482 persons, most of them
Japanese whose loyalty was suspect. In the months that followed,
1,875 residents of Japanese ancestry were sent to the mainland for
internment.16
Along with the Japanese, alien Koreans in Hawai'i had begun to
feel the weight of legal restrictions even before the opening attack
of the war. On July 26, 1941, the assets of Japanese nationals in the
United States had been frozen by presidential order. Controls were
tightened further after the beginning of hostilities, and nationals of
countries at war with the United States were permitted to continue
commercial activities only under a licensing system. The first general
license issued under this system in Hawai'i allowed "normal activities"
but forbade such things as buying and selling real property and securi-
ties, capital transactions, and "unusual" accumulations of inventory.
A second general license restricted bank withdrawals to $200 per
month for living expenses, but no more than $50 could be withdrawn
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in a single week. A third license granted during December 1941
authorized payment of wages, salaries, and commissions to enemy
aliens, but required that amounts over $200 per month be deposited
in blocked accounts.17
Also of great impact on the daily lives of those affected was the
policy toward alien Japanese promulgated the day after the Pearl
Harbor attack. The policy, contained in General Orders No. 5, did
not mention Koreans specifically, but military authorities regarded
alien Koreans as subjects of Japan and therefore bound by the same
restrictions. The order prohibited possession of such things as
firearms and other weapons, shortwave radios, and cameras. It also
outlawed writing, publishing, or printing attacks or threats on the
government or its policies, and required those covered to obtain
permission from the Army provost marshal before traveling or
changing residence or working place. Ten days later, the list of
proscribed articles was enlarged, and enemy aliens were directed to
carry on their persons the certificates that had been issued to them
under the Alien Registration Act of 1940.18
Although they could go about normal activities without special
permission during the day, aliens of enemy nationality were required
to be off the streets during the hours of blackout, which began earlier
than the curfew for the general population.19
Such restrictions were not generally imposed on Koreans on the
mainland. Department of Justice regulations that limited the activities
of alien Japanese in the continental United States specifically
exempted Koreans. The same was true of the regulations governing
the enemy alien registraton program set up in January 1942.20 Once
martial law was declared in Hawai'i, however, the Justice Department
had no authority in the islands, and the treatment of Koreans was
at the pleasure of the military governor.
To be sure, some regulations were not rigidly enforced. Alien
Koreans were allowed to work in some areas where alien Japanese
were not. Liquor licenses were granted to Koreans while denied to
Japanese. Some Koreans were said to have been allowed to ignore
the ban on possession of shortwave radios and cameras. There clearly
was a tacit understanding that for some purposes Koreans were to be
distinguished from alien Japanese, but these exceptions were not
stated in any of the published regulations, and many restrictions
were in fact enforced.21
In addition to the restrictive curfew and financial controls,
Koreans were not free to change residences or jobs without permis-
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sion. In some cases, Koreans were denied permission to travel among
the islands by air because of their enemy-alien status.22 A prominent
Korean physician, Y.G. Yang (later Republic of Korea ambassador
to the United States), volunteered for the Army immediately after
the first attack, was accepted and commissioned, and worked for a
number of days without compensation before being dismissed when
it was realized that he was an alien.23 The right of Koreans to receive
the benefits of insurance coverage appears not to have been confirmed
until 1943, and Koreans were discriminated against in the purchase
of drugs and medical supplies until July 1943.24 In at least one case, a
Korean was apprehended by military intelligence officers for distri-
buting leaflets alleged to be creating unrest and confusion by showing
a lack of unity among the Korean people.25
A particularly embittering experience occurred in March 1942,
when alien Koreans working on defense projects were suddenly
required to exchange their white-bordered identification badges for
black-bordered badges of the type previously issued only to Japanese
and used to restrict the wearer's movements within defense areas.
The protests of the workers won only a small concession: the words
"I am Korean" were stamped across the bottom of their new badges.26
In these confusing circumstances, Koreans naturally wanted a
definitive clarification of their status. But there was more involved
than merely obtaining certain knowledge as to which rules would
apply and which would not. Treating Koreans as subjects of Japan
struck cruelly at the Korean's pride in his national identity, his pride
in the Korean struggle against Japanese aggression, and his sense of
allegiance to his adopted homeland. How could there be any question
of Korean loyalties in a war between the United States and Japan?
As one Korean wrote to the editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin:
Of course, we Koreans do not worry much about going to bed early or stay in the house
after blackout time in the nights, as we are all hard working people and need rest and
good sleep, but what we are greatly concerned about is that we are classified as ENEMY
aliens.
Japanese say Koreans are Number One enemy to Japan, and our American friends
put us on the enemy side, while we are trying to show our loyalty. . . . It is really hard
to understand.27
The classification of their elders as enemy aliens inevitably touched
the lives of younger Koreans, as well. One Korean American told of
discrimination by his employer and described himself as "heartsick
and sore":
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I act, speak and think like an American. . . . I never thought of myself as anything but
an American. My parents have always taught my sister and I to be good Americans.
And for themselves they always thought of the United States as their liberator. . . . Why
should the alien Koreans be classified as enemies and let them pass the taint to their
children, when they hate the Japs and taught their children to hate the Japs?28
In the absence of official recognition of their loyalty, Koreans in
Hawai'i did their best to maintain the distinction between themselves
and the Japanese in the public eye. They carried special identification
cards and buttons prepared by organizations such as the United
Korean Committee, and traditional Korean-style dresses began
appearing more frequently.29 At the same time, leaders of the
Korean community began a campaign to bring about a change in
their legal status.
THE CAMPAIGN FOR A CHANGE OF STATUS
The campaign to be freed of the enemy-alien label included letters
and cables to public officials, petitions, newspaper editorials, and
personal representations. This effort began immediately after the
outbreak of the war and reached a climax in the spring of 1943 in a
well-publicized case in which a Korean civic leader was arrested for
violation of the curfew regulations. The campaign brought the
plight of Koreans to public attention and made the authorities aware
of the intensity of Korean desires, but it did not achieve its major
aim, the exemption of Koreans from enemy-alien controls.
When General Orders No. 5 appeared on December 8, 1941,
Koreans immediately wondered about their status under martial
law. Won Soon Lee, chairman of the United Korean Committee,
raised the issue on December 10 in a letter to General Short, who
referred the matter to intelligence and legal officers.30
Staff memoranda prepared in the judge advocate's office and the
executive office of the military governor agreed that under inter-
national law Koreans had become Japanese subjects by virtue of the
annexation of Korea. The Immigration and Naturalization Office in
Honolulu had taken this position for years, and Koreans traveling
from Hawai'i to Korea had been required to have Japanese passports.
There were considerations that might make it advantageous to
overlook this technicality. For example, longtime Hawai'i residents,
including federal officials, considered Koreans to be militantly
anti-Japanese and believed they would work easily with other ethnic
groups and would remain aloof from the Japanese. But there were
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negative factors as well, and one in particular that seems consistently
to have undergirded military attitudes toward Koreans was stated
explicity: it was claimed to be the consensus of Hawaii residents that
"as individuals Koreans are shifty, dishonest, tricky and liars in
business." In the end, the recommendation was to treat Koreans as
enemy aliens for the moment and buck the question to Washington.31
This recommendation was accepted as policy, even though the
considerations on which it was based were quite legalistic and might
easily have been discounted, as was the case on the mainland.32
While waiting for a local policy, the United Korean Committee
approached the Department of State, linking Korean status to the
question of American recognition of the independence of Korea and
of a Korean government in exile. A cable sent to Secretary of State
Cordell Hull on December 16 asked for clarification of the situation
and pointed out that most of the alien Koreans in Hawai'i had left
Korea before the Japanese annexation and had never submitted to
Japanese authority. A subsequent cable on January 16, 1942, and a
letter the following day emphasized the injustice that would be done
if Koreans were treated as Japanese subjects in the registration of
enemy aliens ordered by presidential proclamation. The letter
appealed for some such designation as "friendly aliens" so that
Koreans might be spared the "undeserved stigma of an enemy at
war with the United States."33
The intercession of Hawai'i's delegate to Congress, Samuel Wilder
King, also was sought, and King called for both reclassification of
Korean aliens and formal recognition of a Korean government in
exile.34
The State Department was not in a position to change the status
of Koreans in Hawai'i and was not persuaded of the value of recogniz-
ing a government in exile, and so the appeals were turned aside
with noncommittal replies and references to the Justice Department,
which was responsible for alien registration and control programs.35
The Justice Department did grant exemptions to those in the
continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, but
its regulations had little meaning for Koreans in Hawai'i. Once the
territorial government had passed to Army control, neither the State
Department nor the Justice Department had much influence on
affairs in Hawai'i.36
Although the United Korean Committee continued to maintain
that the State Department was responsible for decisions regarding
Korean status, it began directing more attention toward Secretary
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of War Henry L. Stimson and Lieutenant General Delos G. Emmons,
who had replaced Short as Army commander in Hawai'i.37 The War
Department gave assurances that it would apply in Hawai'i the same
registration procedures adopted on the mainland by the Justice
Department, and since the mainland procedures exempted Koreans,
the registration crisis dissipated.38 In actuality, the status question
was merely sidestepped. The military decided that another registra-
tion program in Hawai'i was superfluous: a registration of all persons
in the territory had been started, all enemy aliens had been ordered
to carry the certificates issued them under the 1940 registration act,
and military intelligence agencies were already keeping extensive
files on enemy aliens.39
Another channel for Korean pressure was the program conducted
by the Public Morale Section in the Territorial Office of Civilian
Defense, which organized committees of each ethnic group as a focus of
expressions of loyalty to the United States.40 As part of this effort, the
Morale Section compiled a brief report on the Korean organizations
in the territory in late December and invited a number of Korean
leaders to a meeting on January 13, 1942, to discuss formation of a
Korean committee. A second meeting was held January 16 to request
a report on Korean activities and to name the Korean Executive
Committee, whose ten members were selected from a larger list
submitted by the United Korean Committee.41
The Korean Executive Committee organized itself the following
day, choosing J.K. Dunn as chairman and Nodie K. Sohn as secretary,
and by January 20 had submitted the requested report on Korean
activities.42
At a third meeting, held January 29, the seven committee members
present unanimously agreed that the greatest need of Koreans in
Hawai'i was clarification of their legal status. The committee pointed
out that Koreans were being deterred from contributing to the war
effort through purchase of defense bonds because any bonds they
bought were being classified as enemy alien property and im-
pounded.43
A report on Korean attitudes submitted after this meeting
stressed Korean loyalty and the desire to participate in the war
effort and played down hostility toward the Japanese in Hawai'i.
It also contained a plea for reclassification and suggested lifting
the freeze on the funds of alien Koreans as a first step toward
reclassification.44
After a month and a half of working with the Korean Executive
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Committee, Gordon Bowles of the Morale Section judged Korean
leaders to be relatively unconcerned about other sectors of the
community and about morale matters. Rather, they were concentrat-
ing on agitation for recognition of the Korean Provisional Govern-
ment and other activities that would publicize the cause of Korean
independence. "The adult Koreans are interested first of all in the
liberation of their land," Bowles wrote. "They are only secondarily
interested in America. As long as helping America will help Korea,
they will do what they can." He suggested that the Koreans wanted
a change of status and lifting of the financial freeze more for the
attention they would bring to the Korean cause than for the improved
conditions they would create.45
Despite Bowles's cynicism, the Morale Section on March 16, 1942,
prepared a memorandum recommending that alien Koreans be
officially classified as "friendly aliens." The memorandum pointed
out that the Japanese government itself distinguished between those
of Korean and Japanese ancestry and discriminated against the
former. This could be a convenient basis for the proposed classifica-
tion, and there seemed to be no means by which Japan could benefit
from it. The memorandum predicted that the change would dispell
the feeling of injustice harbored by Koreans and would result in
more enthusiastic support of the war effort.46 A suggested draft of a
new general order on the status of Koreans was prepared the follow-
ing day, and on March 19 another Morale Section memorandum
referred to an imminent relaxation of financial controls and asked
whether a general order could not also be issued changing Koreans
from "enemy" to "friendly" aliens. This memorandum took particu-
lar note of problems that had been arising concerning alien Koreans
working in defense-related areas such as the waterfront.47
These proposals evidently stemmed both from the contacts made
through the Korean Executive Committee and from a separate plea
from the United Korean Committee, which prepared a paper
emphasizing the cultural and political distinctions between the
Korean and Japanese people. The paper said Koreans were not
disgruntled by restrictions necessary for the territory's security but
could be expected to participate even more in defense work if "the
revolting technicality" of being classified as Japanese subjects were
changed. It expressed appreciation for the extralegal privileges
already granted, which constituted a kind of unofficial recognition,
but declared that "to be continuously placed in the ranks of the
enemy aliens is frankly mentally damaging."48
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There were in the minds of military authorities, however, more
compelling reasons for maintaining the status quo, and these requests
did not lead to the desired change of status.
The relaxation of financial controls did provide something of a
boost, though. This occurred on March 21, when Governor Joseph
B. Poindexter signed an order granting Koreans the status of
"generally licensed nationals." The main effects of this were to allow
business to be transacted freely without special licenses and to permit
withdrawal of any amounts desired from bank accounts.49
While this lifted morale, it was still short of the desired formal
acceptance of Koreans as allies in the war against the Axis powers,
as is evident from a petition addressed to General Emmons by the
United Korean Committee in June. The petition recited the high-
lights of the Korean anti-Japanese struggle since 1905 and noted the
privileges already extended to Koreans without damage to the war
effort or to security. What was desired now, the petition said, was
formal recognition of Koreans as "friendly aliens." Army intelligence
officers recommended, however, that the Koreans be told that the
State Department had jurisdiction in the matter.50
Korean leaders also attempted to build wider support through
public relations activities, particularly through the English-language
columns of the Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly, a newspaper
published in Honolulu by the Kungmin-hoe and Tongji-hoe. The
English section of the paper was written to present the Korean
position to readers outside the Korean community and was circulated
among officials whose duties touched on Korean affairs.51
A long column in the newspaper on February 11, 1942, laid out
the bases for Korean claims to friendly-alien status and argued that
even though barred from naturalization, Koreans had been in every
respect loyal to American principles and institutions and had by
every means shown themselves to be enemies of Japan.52
More than a year later, when the issue remained unresolved, the
Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly editorialized:
In spite of all our strenuous efforts to get away from that hateful appellation, a Japanese
subject or an eneniy alien, that name is repeatedly tagged onto us by this and that autho-
rity, totally against our will. Is there in this world a worse Jap hater than a Korean?
The most ready answer from all those who know anything about those two peoples
would be an emphatic no! . . .
The reason why some authorities insist on pushing a friend, of however meager means
away into the category of an enemy is quite beyond the grasp of the unsophisticated mind
of a Korean. . . . The Koreans are willing to do anything within their power to get rid
of this hideous and tormenting tag. . . . Were not all American people or their forebears
once fugitive from some form of tyranny themselves?53
189
At the same time, Koreans attempted to build their image as a
cooperative ally through participation in defense-related activities.
They submitted recommendations on the defense of the territory64
and gave assurances, both privately and in published statements,
that despite the intensity of their feelings, they would refrain from
inflammatory attacks on Japanese residents.65 They also made
financial contributions to the war effort. A special program held in
the spring of 1942 netted $1,105.90 for the American Red Gross, and
an eight-month "Korean Victory Drive" in 1943 raised $26,265.35,
which was sent to President Roosevelt for use in prosecuting the
war.56
After public attention was focused on the Korean status question
by the Sohn case in the spring of 1943 (discussed below), the Koreans
also received editorial support from Honolulu's major daily news-
papers.
Galling the situation "an injustice and a tragedy," the Honolulu
Star-Bulletin observed that Koreans were being "stigmatized by
inclusion with the people who have proved their worst enemies, their
most ruthless exploiters, their most implacable oppressors . . . it is
outrageous that Koreans should continue to be treated as enemy
aliens." On another occasion, the paper called the classification of
Koreans "a legalistic interpretation which needs to be knocked out,
and knocked out quickly."57
The Honolulu Advertiser, though supportive, was less forthrightly so.
It excused the military government from responsibility for the
situation and suggested that Congress take up the matter, counseling
Koreans meanwhile to "bear their cross with all possible patience,
finding what comfort they can in the knowledge that American
sympathy is with them." Another editorial suggested that Koreans,
because of their own political infighting, might themselves be respon-
sible for their predicament.68
Another aspect of the campaign for reclassification was the
lobbying carried on in Washington. Syngman Rhee, a longtime
resident of Hawai'i and later first president of the Republic of Korea,
was the best known of the Korean lobbyists, but there were others
as well, including J. K. Dunn of the United Korean Committee and
Kilsoo K. Haan of the Sino-Korean People's League. Rhee sought
early in the war to get better treatment for Koreans in Hawai'i. On
March 30, 1942, he complained to Secretary of War Stimson that
the restrictions imposed in Hawai'i were inconsistent with the
regulations adopted by the attorney general. Stimson replied a month
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later, saying field commanders had been directed to exempt from
enemy-alien restrictions those Koreans who met the criteria of the
attorney general's regulations.69 Rhee apparently considered the
status question settled, but, in fact, these orders applied only to
Koreans in military service and resulted in no change in the treat-
ment of civilian Koreans in Hawai'i.
The failure of all these endeavors to bring about a change in
policy is indicated by the absence of any exemption for Koreans in
the new enemy-alien regulations issued in March 1943 when the
authority of the civil government was partially restored and a new
set of general orders promulgated.60 Memoranda exchanged shortly
afterward show that this was not an oversight and that the impetus
for maintaining the status quo came from intelligence officers, who
recommended that "in the interests of the internal security" Koreans
should continue to be classified as enemy aliens, but that restrictions
on their movements and activities should be "moderated to the
maximum possible consistent with good judgment and fairness."61
Soon after this affirmation of the existing policy, the issue received
its greatest public exposure as a result of the arrest of a Korean civic
leader, Syung Woo Sohn, for violation of the curfew for enemy
aliens. Much of that exposure was the result of the politics of the
Korean independence movement.
Sohn was 59 years old, the owner of a North King Street shoe
repair business, and had come to Hawai'i in 1905. He had been
active in Korean independence activities in Hawai'i and at the time
of his arrest was president of the Hawai'i chapter of the Tongji-hoe,
an organization formed in the 1920s to support Syngman Rhee.
Sohn's wife, Nodie K. Sohn, had served as superintendent of the
Korean Christian Institute, with which Rhee was associated, and
as an officer of the Tongji-hoe and was known as an intimate friend
ofRhee's.62
On the evening of March 28, 1943, Sohn's car stalled in the 1600
block of Liliha Street, preventing him from reaching his home on
Kilohana Street in Kalihi Valley before the beginning of blackout
at 7:45 p.m. He was arrested by two Honolulu policemen at 8:15
p.m., charged with violating the regulations prohibiting enemy
aliens from being abroad during blackout, and released on $50 bail.
The case received no publicity until April 30, when Sohn appeared
to answer the charge in the provost court.63
During the hearing, Sohn's attorney, Willson C. Moore, argued
that Sohn deserved to be treated as a friendly alien because he had
left Korea on a Korean passport before the Japanese annexation,
which, in any case, had been a illegal seizure, and had made himself
known as an enemy of Japan through his participation in Korean
patriotic organizations. He had remained an alien only because
American law denied him the privilege of naturalization. The provost
judge, Lieutenant Colonel Moe D. Baroff, expressed sympathy with
the predicament of Sohn and other alien Koreans but maintained
that he was bound by the general orders of the military governor and
had no choice but to find Sohn guilty. He fined Sohn $10 with
payment suspended.64
Sohn petitioned General Emmons for a review of his conviction,
basing his appeal largely on Secretary of War Stimson's April 30,
1942, letter to Rhee concerning the attorney general's exemption of
Koreans from enemy-alien restrictions. Other appeals in support of
Sohn were made to the executive officer of the military government.
These, too, relied heavily on Stimson's letter.66
Emmons was not persuaded by Sohn's petition, with its 12 pages
of case law citations, and declined to reverse the findings of the
provost court, in effect declaring that Koreans would continue to be
treated as enemy aliens under the curfew regulations.66
But for the politics of the Korean independence movement and
Sohn's close link with Rhee, the matter might have been forgotten.67
Sohn's wife sought Rhee's intervention immediately after her
husband's arrest, however, and Rhee responded with a promise to
take the status issue to Congress. "US seems to be at war with Korea
rather than Japan," he wrote to her in April. "We are determined
to find out who is running this country, the Americans or the Japs."68
Rhee at that moment faced a serious challenge to his domination
of the independence movement in the United States. Months of
friction over his position vis-a-vis the United Korean Committee
had led to suspension of that organization's financial support for
his Washington office (the Korean Commission) and to a serious
effort, especially among Korean leaders in Los Angeles, to force
Rhee aside in favor of new leadership. Analysts of Korean affairs
viewed Rhee's interest in the Sohn case in this context and inter-
preted his intervention as an attempt to solidify his position in
Hawai'i, where he still enjoyed the support of the Tongji-hoe.
Whether this was the main consideration or not, the Sohn case did
present an opportunity to raise again the question of American
recognition of the Korean Provisional Government.69
Rhee was quickly in touch with Hawai'i's congressional delegate,
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Joseph R. Farrington, and officers in the War Department. He also
wired Governor Ingram M. Stainback and William Borthwick, the
territorial tax commissioner, a longtime friend. After Sohn's convic-
tion in the provost court, Rhee complained to Secretary Stimson and
to President Roosevelt, asking Roosevelt to intervene in the case.70
Farrington joined Rhee's appeals, writing to Assistant Secretary
of War John J. McCloy on May 25 to ask whether the Sohn convic-
tion would be allowed to stand and, if so, how this could be reconciled
with the treatment of Koreans as friendly aliens in so many other
matters.71
Letters were also being written by Rhee's main rival in Washing-
ton, Kilsoo Haan, and, at Haan's behest, by Senator Guy M.
Gillette, an Iowa Democrat whom Haan had been cultivating.72
Farrington's inquiry was answered almost immediately by an aide
to McGloy, Colonel William P. Scobey, who indicated that the status
of Koreans in Hawai'i was a familiar subject. While the War
Department recognized the attorney general's rulings, he said, the
local commander in Hawai'i had determined that "because of
military necessity" alien Koreans should continue to be classified as
enemy aliens. He said, however, that he was not at liberty to explain
why this was insisted upon. Scobey suggested that Farrington "quiet
the fears of Koreans by informing them that the Hawaiian Depart-
ment does and will give careful consideration to all individual cases
so that no injustice will be occasioned to any loyal Korean."73
Rhee's letter to Stimson and that of Gillette to Roosevelt prompted
a review of the situation by the War Department's Military Intelli-
gence Division, the results of which were summed up in a memoran-
dum prepared on June 29, 1943. The review found that Stimson's
letter to Rhee in 1942 had been misleading in that it implied that field
commanders had been ordered to observe the Justice Department
regulations regarding all Korean aliens when, in fact, the War
Department policy concerned only those in military service. The
review also included a query to the Hawaiian Department asking
for specific information on the Sohn case and an explanation of the
policy in force. The upshot of the review was acceptance of the
existing policy and a recommendation that it be continued.74
This review was the basis for a reply sent to Rhee over Stimson's
signature on July 7 in which the various privileges extended to
Koreans in Hawai'i were recited once more and assurances were
given that the War Department valued the cooperation of Koreans
and their opposition to Japan. Nevertheless, because of "military
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necessity" and in the interest of "internal security" it was considered
essential that the few remaining restrictions be enforced.75
Rhee also received a reply from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf
A. Berle, Jr., in behalf of Roosevelt. Writing on July 12, Berle denied
Rhee's claim that the authorities in Hawai'i had violated laws or
regulations in holding Sohn to be an enemy alien, and he emphasized
the "special conditions prevailing in Honolulu and nearby areas"
that made it essential to allow the local commander considerable
discretion.76
Haan's protest to the president was answered by Lieutenant
General Robert G. Richardson, Jr., who had replaced Emmons on
June 1. The gist of his reply was the same: the rinding in the Sohn
case was consistent with the policy that had always been followed in
Hawai'i; the "very satisfactory" relations between Koreans and the
military government had made it possible to grant privileges not
extended to some others; and the cooperative spirit of Koreans was
recognized and appreciated.77
Despite the flurry of activity that surrounded the Sohn case, then,
there was no apparent movement toward a change of status. After
General Emmons's refusal to reverse Sohn's conviction, the Korean
National Herald-Pacific Weekly observed:
Koreans of Hawaii, disappointed and depressed at the thought of being classified as
enemy aliens by military authorities here, are in a state of mental agony and suffering. . . .
Korean national conscience is clear beyond doubt no matter what the technicality of law
interpretation may class them. . . . No matter how much the Koreans bemoan the enemy
alien status, let's prove ourselves worthy of being called the American ally. Let us work
harder and sweat more to accelerate the war efforts. . . . The American sense of justice
and fairness will eventually prevail. . . .78
The application of enemy-alien curfew regulations to Koreans—
which had come to symbolize enemy-alien status itself—was finally
dropped with little fanfare several months later when, on December
4, 1943, the military government promulgated General Orders No.
45, exempting Koreans from the enemy-alien curfew restrictions.
The change followed closely the publication on December 1 of the
Cairo Declaration, in which the chief executives of the United States,
Great Britain, and China announced their determination that Korea
should in due course become independent. According to an official
Army history, it was in keeping with this declaration that the curfew
restriction was lifted.79
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THE BASIS OF ARMY POLICY TOWARD ALIEN KOREANS IN HAWAI I
The Army policy toward Koreans in Hawai'i was based on consid-
erations of internal security, but the documents available give little
evidence for the belief that Koreans threatened the security of
Hawai'i or the United States.
References to national security—without directly accusing any
Korean—appear often in government statements. Stimson, for
example, referred to a need for intensive surveillance because Axis
sympathizers were thought to be operating in the guise of refugees
and foreign nationals.80
When asked for a statement of policy in June 1943, General
Richardson, commander of the Hawaiian Department, contended
that although it had seemed unnecessary to hold alien Koreans to all
of the original limitations placed on enemy aliens, "nevertheless,
considerations of internal security . . . made it necessary to treat
Koreans as enemy aliens for purposes of certain restrictions," namely,
the curfew and restrictions on possession of explosives, arms, and
ammunition. He said this policy was based on careful consideration
by the Army and Navy intelligence agencies and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.81
Some light is shed on the role of Army intelligence by the official
war history of the Army command in Hawai'i. The military intelli-
gence contact officer, who functioned as a liaison and intelligence-
collection agent, suggested in September 1942 that the status of
Koreans be redefined, but the military governor decided that "since
no policy had been established by the War Department each Korean
case would be considered individually." When the question came up
again in March 1943, however, the contact officer recommended
continuing to make exceptions in specific cases but without any
change in stated policy.82
Even less information is available about the roles of naval intelli-
gence and the FBI. According to General Richardson, the naval
intelligence office in Hawai'i was "particularly insistent" in May
1943 that alien Koreans in Hawai'i should not be regarded as
friendly aliens. The FBI, on the other hand, declined to make any
recommendation at that time because the Justice Department had
earlier ruled that Koreans should be considered friendly aliens.83
The Army counter-intelligence office, naval intelligence, and the
FBI worked together closely on all matters touching on internal
security, espionage, and subversive activities in Hawai'i, and in all
probability there were no significant differences of opinion among the
officers of these three agencies. This is suggested by the reports of
Alfred M. Tozzer, an anthropologist who was wartime head of the
Honolulu branch of the Office of Strategic Services. Although not
involved in internal security, Tozzer frequently communicated with
the intelligence staffs and cultivated acquaintances in the Korean
community because of his agency's interest in the Korean indepen-
dence movement. His reports consistently lump together G-2
(military intelligence), the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI
in reporting the suspicions of local officials.84
What, then, were the specific reasons for considering Koreans a
threat to security? Richardson's policy statement prepared for the
War Department listed six of "the more significant reasons":
(1) Many alien Koreans were believed to have ties to Japan
through families or relatives living in Korea or Japan; many of them
were said to have made trips to Japan and Korea;
(2) Many Koreans were said to "have connections which might
allow them to sell their services to the highest bidder." In particular,
it was said that Kilsoo Haan was "known to have a private pipeline
of information from Tokyo which could be assumed to work in both
directions." Haan was reported to have worked as an informant for
both the Japanese consulate in Honolulu and for the American
military intelligence services, making him highly suspect;
(3) Korean nationalist leaders were said to "appear to be
opportunists who are more interested in personal aggrandizement
than they are in organizing a movement representing a sincere
expression of a people who desire to maintain their own national
integrity;"
(4) It was contended that language problems would make the
work of counter-intelligence officers and police more difficult if alien
Koreans were classified as friendly aliens. "It is almost impossible
to distinguish between Koreans and Japanese by sight alone, and
Japanese who speak Korean might try to represent themselves as
Koreans," it was argued;
(5) A change of status for Koreans "might provide an opening
wedge for the Formosans, Okinawans, and other colonists not of pure
Japanese blood;"
196
(6) Existing restrictions were not severe and affected only about
2,500 people, but to exempt these people would unduly strain
intelligence agencies by making it necessary to process them through
alien hearing boards, as had been done with many Japanese, and
this, in turn, would only "invite further unrest and give their
leaders a stronger platform for protest."85
This list hardly gives an impression of a compelling threat to the
security of the islands. Indeed, it is as weighted with political and
bureaucratic considerations as with genuine concern about internal
security. The only person named as a possible threat, Kilsoo Haan,
was not even in Hawai'i during the war. Although he had a small
following in Hawai'i, he was as widely distrusted among Koreans
as he was among American officials. Though investigated by the
FBI, no charges were brought against him, nor was it ever proved
that he actually had the network of secret agents he claimed to
command.86
Tozzer's reports to Washington, which at one time or another
reported most of the concerns listed above, likewise reflect an absence
of firm evidence of Korean disloyalty or espionage. His reports
indicated that prior to December 7, 1941, the Japanese consulate
had had on its payroll three Koreans, one of whom denied it. Besides
these three, there was the case of a Korean Buddhist priest who was
said to be a "good Japanese scholar" and "a likely tool." The FBI
investigated him but "found nothing definite." These were the most
specific allegations Tozzer could report. In sum, there was suspicion
but not a single case in which investigation had warranted the arrest
of a Korean.87
In the development of a policy toward alien Koreans, these
suspicions, nebulous as they were, and a cynical view of the aims of
Korean nationalist leaders were combined with an awareness that
the Koreans in Hawai'i were a small minority with neither significant
influence nor the power to challenge successfully any policy adopted.
Moreover, the Army was well aware that this small minority was
splintered by political differences that made it unlikely that it could
mount a united action that might force revision of the policy before
Army leaders were ready to make changes.88
If the reasons underlying the restrictive policy toward alien
Koreans were no more substantial than this evidence suggests, then
one can fairly conclude that the Korean community was not treated
in accordance with professed American ideals of individual respon-
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sibility and presumption of innocence. To be sure, the magnitude
of the injury done to them does not approach that done to the
thousands of Japanese who were confined to concentration camps
during the war. The injury was psychological rather than physical
or material and seems not to have been long-lasting. Koreans who
remember the war years in Hawai'i tend to regard the restrictions as
trivial and probably necessary in the circumstances, but these are
not the Koreans of an older generation who had such a great
psychological, emotional stake in being recognized as equals in the
battle against Japan, and whose great nationalistic pride could only
be affronted by the policy adopted toward them.
It is easy in retrospect to challenge the necessity of the restrictions,
but the times did not admit of a less cautious course of action. As
Stanley D. Porteus recalled after the war, the early defeats in Europe
generated a pervasive fear of fifth-column activities, and in Hawai'i,
as elsewhere, "sabotage became the mouse under the bed, whose
presence overshadowed all other dangers."89
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